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I. INTRODUCTION 
This report presents the industrial cluster development policy of the Republic of Korea and draws 
lessons from that experience for South Asia. It briefly reviews Korean industrial policy since the 1960s 
and identifies the success factors before studying the evolution of industrial cluster development in 
the country. 
South Asia’s recent economic growth, after the downturn experienced in the previous decade, has 
been strong, but it pales in comparison with East Asia’s. To spur economic growth and reduce poverty 
in South Asia, industrial activity, particularly manufacturing, must expand. Many well-known empirical 
studies, such as that of Chenery, Robinson, and Syrquin (1986), indicate that low-income countries 
have to undergo industrial transformation—labor must shift from agriculture to other industries—to 
escape the poverty trap. South Asia’s large rural population offers significant potential for economic 
growth, if better policies and institutions for industrial development are adopted. The Republic of 
Korea would be a good benchmark in this regard. Industrial development was a major engine of growth 
in that country. The government tried hard to promote industries by designing various policy measures 
and institutions. Government intervention, far from resulting in failure as it has often done in other 
countries, helped the Republic of Korea become a high-income industrialized country. 
South Asian countries differ in population size and level of economic development, as Table 1 shows. 
The states of India have similar wide variations in size and economic activity, making it difficult to 
describe India on the basis of national-level indicators alone. 1 Therefore, this report does not prescribe 
a one-size-fits-all method of industrial cluster development for South Asia, but instead introduces the 
policy experience of the Republic of Korea in this regard, and the success factors, particularly in terms 
of policy implementation, that could promote industrial growth in South Asia as well. Although the 
Korean experience was not without its trials and errors, the government took the necessary policy 
measures and established support institutions to accomplish the goal once it was set.2 
Section II is a very short review of South Asia’s economic development in comparison with the 
economic development of East Asian countries including the Republic of Korea. It shows that 
industrial development, particularly the growth of manufacturing, is very important for economic 
growth and poverty reduction in the region.  
Section III briefly traces the history of industrial policy in the Republic of Korea since the 1960s, with 
emphasis on the government’s export promotion policies of the 1960s, and its aggressive support for 
heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s.  
  
                                                            
1   Uttar Pradesh has a population of nearly 200 million, equivalent to Brazil’s. Goa, a small state with a population of 14.6 
million, had value added per capita of $2,697 in 2009/10, three times higher than that of Bihar ($786)  (Cho, Choi, and 
Song 2011, 31). 
2   Amsden (1989) and Woo (1991), among many others, describe the Republic of Korea as a developing state that 
intervened vigorously in the economy to promote growth. 
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Section IV contains an overview of the evolution of industrial cluster development policy in the 
Republic of Korea, chiefly the construction of industrial parks on greenfield sites in the 1960s and 
1970s. The shift in the country’s industrial structure toward more technology- and 
knowledge-intensive industries made improvements in innovation a major policy concern. Building 
regional clusters that would encourage cooperation between industry and research was a way of 
addressing that concern. The large industrial complexes have expanded their reach since then as 
industrial production has grown, providing not only production space but also various services and 
support for the resident companies.  
Finally, Section V enumerates the lessons applicable to industrial cluster development in South Asia. 
Even before the term “industrial cluster” became popular, the Republic of Korea constructed large-
scale industrial parks to implement its major policy for industrial cluster development in an era of rapid 
industrial transformation. Valuable lessons may be learned from this experience to benefit large-scale 
industrial promotion in South Asia, such as the Economic Corridor Program in India. The Indian 
government targeted a gross domestic product (GDP) share of 25% for manufacturing by 2002 (ADB 
2014) as part of its new manufacturing policy and has declared its intent to promote industries under 
the program, which tries to maximize integration between economic hubs in predefined regions of the 
country with large concentrations of resources.3  
Moreover, the Indian government’s Make in India initiative and particularly its East Coast Economic 
Corridor project call for the construction of trade infrastructure and support for industrial 
production clusters, to secure India’s place in the global production network. The policy experience 
of the Republic of Korea would be relevant to achieving these export promotion and regional 
integration targets. 
 
II. SOUTH ASIA’S INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
AND THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 
 
South Asia’s Industrial Development versus East Asia’s 
 
South Asia consists of countries of varied size and income levels, as Table 1 shows. Except for Bhutan 
and Maldives, most South Asian countries are highly populated and have large numbers of rural poor. 
More than 60% of the population in most South Asian countries lives in the rural areas, compared with 
less than 50% in East Asian countries. The two subregions also differ in the industry share of value 
added: 40% for most East Asian countries, compared with less than 30% for most South Asian 
countries except for Bhutan, where hydroelectric power generation accounts for a large share of GDP. 
It is widely known that the engine of growth in East Asia is manufacturing for export, as the share of 
manufactures in total exports indicates. It is higher than 70% throughout the region except for 
resource-rich Indonesia and Malaysia.  
  
                                                            
3  The Economic Corridor Program may therefore be adequate for industrial promotion, which requires the strengthening of 
links. For a discussion of the economic corridor concept, see Brunner (2013). 
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Table 1: South Asia vs East Asia, 2013 
Country 
Population 
(’000) 
GDP per Capita 
(current prices, $) 
Industry Share 
of Value 
Added  
(%) 
Rural 
Population 
(% of total 
population) 
Manufacturing
Exports 
(% of merchandise 
exports) 
South Asia 
Afghanistan 30,552 665 21.2 74.1 14.2 
Bangladesh 156,595 958 27.6 67.2 92.8 
Bhutan 754 2,363 44.6 62.9 68.6 
India 1,252,140 1,499 24.8 68.0 61.9 
Maldives 345 6,666 22.5 56.6 0.0 
Nepal 27,797 694 15.7 82.1 68.7 
Pakistan 182,143 1,275 21.1 62.1 74.0 
Sri Lanka 20,483 3,280 32.5 81.7 69.8 
East Asia 
China, 
People’s 
Republic of 1,357,380 6,807 43.9 47.0 94.0 
Indonesia 249,866 3,475 45.7 48.0 37.8 
Korea, 
Republic of 50,220 25,977 38.6 18.0 86.2 
Malaysia 29,717 10,538 40.5 27.0 60.8 
Thailand 67,011 5,779 42.5 52.0 74.9 
GDP = gross domestic product 
Note: The GDP growth rate is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local 
currency. No GDP growth rate data before 2003 are available for Afghanistan, and none before 2002 in the case of the 
Maldives. Industry comprises mining, manufacturing, construction, and utilities. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
The Republic of Korea is representative of the East Asian growth model. Resource-poor except for 
abundant underused labor resources, it became a high-income country in less than 3 decades. It was 
less developed than South Asian countries in the 1960s, at the start of industrial development. In 1965, 
industry’s GDP share was 21.3% and 67.6% of the total population lived in the rural areas. Per capita 
GDP was $105, or about $598 if adjusted for inflation with the US GDP deflator.4 In 1965–1985, GDP 
grew by 9.1% yearly. Industry contributed 36.1% of GDP in 1985 and per capita GDP amounted to $2,542 
($4,730 in 2013 current prices). In 2013, industry’s share of GDP was 38.1% and the rural population 
made up 17.1% of the total population.5 The continuous expansion of manufacturing exports through 
industrial diversification and upgrading made rapid growth possible. 
                                                            
4   GDP per capita in US dollars is not an adequate measure for comparison because of fluctuations in the exchange rate. It 
was $834 in the Republic of Korea before the won was devalued in 1964. GDP per capita at the purchasing power parity 
(PPP) exchange rate would be a better measure of living standards. The figure mentioned here is provided only for rough 
comparison. 
5   The data for the Republic of Korea are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
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Most South Asian countries, on the other hand, have been industrially stagnant. The share of industry 
in total value added has stayed at less than 30% (Figure 1). The only exception is Bhutan, where 
hydroelectric power generation increased the industry share from 10% in 1980 to 45% in 2013. The 
figure for the share of manufactured exports in total exports is not much different from that shown in 
Figure 1.  
 
For South Asia as a region to grow at continuously high rates, industrial development, particularly the 
growth of manufacturing in countries with a population of more than 20 million, such as India, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, is critical. Services can spur economic growth, as evidenced 
by India’s information technology (IT) industry and tourism in Nepal, but most developed countries 
became advanced economies largely because of manufacturing and industrial development.  
Although represented as an increase in the GDP share of industry over time, industrial development 
accompanies continuous industrial transformation toward higher-value-added production. As the 
export structure of the Republic of Korea (Table 4 in Section III) indicates, exports of labor-intensive 
industries, such as textiles, plywood, and wigs gave rise to the country’s initial spurt of industrial growth. 
Then the industry structure shifted toward more capital-intensive and technologically sophisticated 
industries, such as electronics, shipbuilding, and chemical products. Now, the major industries are 
research and development (R&D) intensive—semiconductors, mobile phones, and automobiles, 
among others. This experience is similar to that of other East Asian countries, with a time lag.6 Despite 
the ever-changing business environment and the constant need for a creative strategic response, 
                                                            
6   Japan was ahead of the Republic of Korea, which in turn was followed by the PRC. Global production sharing and rapid 
diffusion of technologies overseas have since shortened the time lag between leaders and followers in East Asia. 
Figure 1: Share of Industry in Total Value Added (%)
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
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South Asia is expected to follow the industrial transformation path of East Asia from labor-intensive to 
capital- and technology-intensive industries.7 The stylized pattern of industrial development appears 
to be due to the nature of manufacturing, which requires coordination among interlinked industries 
with their differing demand for technology and know-how, well-trained technicians and workers, and 
sizable investment in equipment and facilities. The presence of foreign-invested enterprises and the 
rise in international production sharing may have reduced the lag, but all of the foregoing factors and 
the improvement of domestic industrial capacity for long-term industrial development still take time as 
well as experience to achieve.  
Table 4 in Section III also shows the importance of labor-intensive manufacturing for industrial 
development. Textiles stayed atop the list of Korean exports for almost 3 decades even with the 
capital- and technology-intensive industry changes in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1985, textiles were the 
top export products and footwear came in fourth; these two accounted for about 16% of the country’s 
total exports. Electronics, another leading export industry, derived its competitiveness from its ranks of 
well-trained assembly-line workers until the move toward technology-based industries, such as 
semiconductors. South Asian countries should therefore pay more attention to expanding their labor-
intensive manufacturing sectors. Forward- and backward-linked production in labor-intensive 
industries, such as textiles, footwear, and various consumer goods, will not only help countries reduce 
poverty by creating jobs for unskilled workers but also provide the basis for further industrial 
development by offering opportunities for human resource development and technology upgrading. 
Jobs for skilled workers with higher education will open up as manufacturing advances into higher-
value-adding activities. Manufacturing will grow once human capital is built through learning by doing.8 
As the share of manufactured exports indicates, Bangladesh has attracted investments in garment 
manufacturing and enlarged its share of the world market, particularly in knitwear clothing. It gained a 
head start with the help of foreign investment from the Republic of Korea under the Multifiber 
Arrangement of 1979, and start-ups established by former employees of foreign-invested enterprises 
built on that initial advantage (Mottaleb and Sonobe 2011). Incentives, such as duty-free machinery 
import and land donations from the Bangladesh government, have helped the industry grow. But 
Bangladesh must diversify its export structure by promoting backward-linked fabric production and 
finding new sectors that could exploit the country’s accumulated entrepreneurship and abundant 
labor.9 Other labor-intensive sectors apart from garment production, such as horticultural products, 
leather goods, light engineering products, and some chemical products, hold potential for comparative 
advantage (Mahmud 2003). In the long run, the country should move up the product ladder to higher-
value-adding sectors as it becomes less able to compete on the basis of cheap labor. Figure 1 shows 
that the value-added share of industry has increased slowly despite the recent surge of over 90% in the 
share of manufactured exports. This implies a need for more value addition to generate higher income 
from exports. 
Other South Asian countries must encourage the growth of labor-intensive manufacturing exports in 
sectors where they have a comparative advantage. Competitive pressure from the People’s Republic of 
                                                            
7   India, a very large country with states in diverse stages of industrial development, from cottage industries to capital-
intensive and IT service industries, would be an exception. 
8   The Lucky-Goldstar (LG) group started as a small cosmetic cream factory, then built a plastic-molding plant to produce 
plastic caps for cream jars. It later expanded its product line to include combs, soaps, and other chemical products, thus 
laying the foundation for the establishment of LG Chem, a major chemical company that turns out basic materials and 
chemicals as well as advanced materials for electronics and rechargeable batteries for electronic cars. The LG story is told 
by the chairman of the LG group in Amsden (1989, 126). 
9  Dependence on imported fabrics and yarns increases the lead time for meeting orders and works against the 
competitiveness of garment exporters. The domestic value chain for garment production must be extended to limit or 
avoid such dependence. 
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China (PRC) and other countries has not held back the emergence of new opportunities in 
manufacturing, especially given the PRC’s higher-wage trajectory. The large population and wide range 
of industrial development in South Asia should enable the region, particularly India, to increase the 
contribution of manufacturing to GDP by giving various manufacturing sectors, including labor-
intensive ones, more room to grow.10 The much-lower share of Indian manufactured exports (61.9%) 
relative to the PRC’s (94.0%) suggests their potential for higher growth. The same potential exists in 
Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and other populous countries. South Asia’s most valuable resource is its 
cheap abundant labor. An economic development strategy focused on labor-intensive manufacturing 
would be consistent with its comparative advantage. 
Challenges of Economic Reform for Industrial Development 
 
The East Asian countries evidently got the basics right.11 Unlike countries in other developing regions, 
they maintained a stable macroeconomic environment through prudent fiscal policies and competitive 
exchange rates, and were open to international trade and investment from abroad. The governments 
were active investors in education and infrastructure, and provided a favorable environment to 
business. Strong and effective government made all this possible. Although not democratic in the era 
of rapid growth, the Korean and Taipei,China governments gave sincere and constructive support for 
industrial development and economic growth.    
The South Asian countries should likewise strive to get the basics right and narrow the reform gaps. To 
induce economic growth in South Asia, India, which accounts for 70% of the region’s population and 
80% of its GDP, should take a pivotal role in policy and institutional reform. However, its public sector 
finances are in chronic deficit. Internal and external trade barriers, price controls, and wasteful 
subsidies are still significant. The Indian government should actively seek foreign investments, which 
the PRC experience has shown to be crucial in expanding labor-intensive manufacturing. It should 
provide an adequate environment for foreign-invested enterprises to do business by building 
infrastructure and removing rigid regulations on land and labor.  
Other countries in South Asia grapple with worse political and economic problems. Nepal and Pakistan 
are beset by political uncertainty and instability under a centralized state with arbitrary power, and by 
crime and insecurity and trade union militancy. ADB (2009) also noted Nepal’s low availability of 
energy, weak industrial infrastructure, and other technology and human resource constraints—
observations seconded by a mayor in Nepal in 2013 (Sapkota 2013). Pakistan’s main problems are 
macroeconomic instability, poor infrastructure, and the threat of social unrest given the scarcity of 
employment opportunities for its large and growing labor force (Sánchez-Triana et al. 2014). Sri Lanka 
is relatively better off economically despite its long civil war, but has reportedly failed to take advantage 
of the opportunities following the end of the military conflict and has moved away from trade 
liberalization and back toward nationalist–populist state-centered economic policies (Athukorala and 
Jayasuriya 2012). 
Although most South Asian countries adopted economic reforms in place of earlier inward-looking 
policies, their governments have been less than effective in implementing them.12 The indicators in 
                                                            
10  According to Felipe, Kumar, and Abdon (2010), India’s manufacturing sector has a smaller share of GDP than its 
counterparts in East Asian countries. The authors blame the negative effects of the policy bias toward the labor-intensive 
sector, such as the protection of labor-intensive small-scale enterprises. India’s manufacturing sector, on the other hand, 
is relatively well diversified and sophisticated. 
11  See MacDonald et al. (1993). 
12  Sri Lanka introduced economic reforms relatively early, liberalizing its trade and investment regime in the late 1970s. The 
reforms made it possible for the country to grow despite the outbreak of civil conflict (World Bank 2004). Bangladesh also 
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Table 2 show a big gap between South Asia and East Asia in overall ease of doing business. Among the 
South Asian countries, Sri Lanka and Nepal rank relatively high but lower than the PRC. With regard to 
the components of doing business, the gap between the two regions in enforcing contracts, trading 
across borders, gaining access to electricity, and registering property is quite large.13  
 
Table 2: Doing Business Indicators, 2014 
  
Overall 
Ease of 
Doing 
Business 
Starting 
a 
Business 
Dealing with 
Construction 
Permits 
Getting 
Electricity
Registering 
Property 
Getting 
Credit 
Protecting 
Minority 
Investors 
Paying 
Taxes 
Trading 
Across 
Borders 
Enforcing 
Contracts
Resolving 
Insolvency
Afghanistan 182 17 182 146 182 86 189 75 183 183 158 
Bangladesh 170 111 142 189 183 125 43 78 140 188 146 
India 140 156 183 134 115 30 21 154 122 186 135 
Maldives 114 41 24 111 168 111 127 130 133 91 132 
Nepal 109 97 126 78 29 111 70 120 169 134 78 
Pakistan 127 109 121 145 111 125 19 168 112 161 81 
Sri Lanka 105 101 60 100 124 86 50 167 85 165 68 
China, 
People’s 
Republic of 
93 151 177 121 38 67 123 127 98 36 52 
Indonesia 117 158 150 101 112 67 43 158 61 171 71 
Korea, 
Republic of 5 16 12 1 78 30 26 24 3 4 5 
Malaysia 20 12 39 28 74 19 5 31 10 30 65 
Thailand 28 68 11 12 28 86 21 63 33 25 44 
South Asia 
average 135 90 120 129 130 96 74 127 135 158 114 
East Asia 
average 53 81 78 53 66 54 44 81 41 53 47 
Note: The ranking covered 211 countries. The average rankings are simple averages of country rankings in each column.  
Source: Doing Business DB (http://www.doingbusiness.org/). 
 
If South Asia is to increase its presence in global supply chains, improving the business environment is 
the first and most important step. The region should also increase the volume of its intraregional trade. 
At present, South Asia is reportedly the least integrated region in the world, with intraregional trade 
accounting for less than 2% of the countries’ combined GDP.14 In East Asia, intraregional trade is as 
high as 20% of regional GDP. Regional integration is important for smaller countries, particularly those 
that are landlocked, such as Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Nepal. Strengthening intraregional production 
networks would also benefit regional labor-intensive manufactured exports. India is very important in 
this regard, yet it does not provide the expected leadership in regional integration. While total outward 
investment by Indian multinational enterprises has increased rapidly, the intraregional share of total 
outward foreign direct investment (FDI) from India has shrunk, according to Athukorala (2013). 
Moreover, Indian overseas investment is mostly of the horizontal rather than the vertical type. India 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
embarked on economic liberalization in the mid-1970s but put off introducing a coherent reform plan until the mid-1980s. 
Nepal’s economic reforms in the mid-1980s supported privatization and placed the country on an outward-oriented 
development path. India was rather late in adopting economic reforms: it introduced neoliberal economic measures in 
1991. 
13  This statement is based on the simple difference in average rankings between the two regions in Table 1. 
14  From The Economist (2008) (http://www.economist.com/node/12749743). 
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should lead the region by initiating further regulatory reform, improving border management, and 
building infrastructure. 
In sum, South Asia should continue to advance economic reform to foster a more open, liberalized 
economic environment, and invite both domestic and foreign enterprises to invest more in 
manufacturing. As many studies, including Athukorala (2013), suggest, for South Asia to increase its 
presence in global production networks, it needs more than cheap abundant labor. It should raise 
productivity by developing human capital, and lower the cost of service links by building infrastructure 
and improving trade-related logistics. Political stability and policy certainty are also obvious 
prerequisites for attracting multinational enterprises to the region. 
Challenges of Industrial Policy 
 
Now let us turn to industrial policy.15 Many reports are critical of traditional industrial policy in South 
Asia, using the term “license-permit raj” for the regime in India, for example. Kaplinsky (1997) defines 
industrial policy as a series of policy instruments including the pervasive licensing of industrial activity; 
the reservation of key areas for state-owned enterprises; inward-oriented trade policy; controls over 
large domestic firms, FDI, and technology transfer; interventions in the labor market designed to 
protect labor; and policies aimed at promoting small-scale industry. 
In 1991, India adopted the so-called New Industrial Policy, which liberalized the economy in favor of 
market mechanisms by abolishing the licensing system and releasing to the private sector economic 
activities previously reserved for state-owned enterprises.16 Since the 1990s, much macrolevel progress 
has been made in restoring incentive systems for the market by normalizing exchange rates and 
liberalizing trade policies.17 With the abolition of the old licensing system, states with favorable 
locations and good institutional and human resource policies have had stronger growth. Laggard states 
without latent capabilities, on the other hand, still suffer from stagnation and large populations with a 
high poverty rate. More attention paid to labor-intensive manufacturing could create many jobs, yet 
the manufacturing sector is shackled by restrictions, such as distortive protection for small-scale 
industries and inefficient state-owned enterprises. In particular, labor legislation and exit policies 
untouched by reform have been detrimental to the growth of domestic manufacturing and foreign 
investment in the sector. 
Besides institutional and infrastructure bottlenecks, a weak domestic supply chain and the lack of 
technology, management, and research constrain manufacturing in South Asia. Bangladesh 
successfully transformed its major export industry, shifting from jute to garments by taking advantage 
of export quotas and preferential access to major markets. But its dependence on imported textiles 
puts the country at a disadvantage. Foreign capital inflows will bring along the technology and 
management skills needed to use the country’s abundant supply of low-cost labor if a better business 
environment is provided. To maximize the spillover effects from the increase in foreign investment, the 
government should strengthen local industrial linkages by encouraging the emergence of many 
forward- and backward-linked domestic supporting enterprises. 
                                                            
15  The focus here is on India. Although the situation may be different in other South Asian countries, the challenges they 
face are similar to India’s. 
16  Most South Asian countries discarded their inward-looking regimes and introduced trade liberalization and privatization 
policies from the mid-1970s until the 1990s, as noted in footnote 12. 
17  Bangladesh also gradually adopted outward-oriented development strategies in the 1980s by withdrawing agricultural 
subsidies and quantitative import restrictions. In 1991, it introduced comprehensive reform by reducing import duties and 
removing controls on the flow of capital (Sultan 2008).  
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Government must take a more active role in this area. 18 Even if macrolevel policy reform were to 
improve the functioning of the market, coordination failures would keep the market from allocating 
resources efficiently.19 Many industrial projects require simultaneous, large-scale investments and 
business services for the investing firms to become profitable. Because of high fixed costs, not all of 
these requirements can be provided by the private sector. Business services and input in particular are 
nontradable and require geographic proximity. Cluster development is aimed at overcoming this 
problem by focusing on the development of a specific sector in a designated area. The narrowest 
version of cluster development is the development of an industrial park, which accommodates 
enterprises linked together in a specific sector.  
While instituting policy reform to liberalize trade and abolish the tight control of industry is related to 
the role of government as regulator, developing clusters and supporting enterprises venturing into new 
businesses require the government to act as promoter or facilitator. For instance, when the 
government approves the use of land for an industrial park, it functions as regulator. But since 
industrial parks ultimately increase local industrial capacity and efficiency, and enable enterprises to 
identify their core competence, the government also serves as promoter.   
India’s Make in India initiative and Industrial Corridor Program reveal the intention of the country’s top 
leaders to change industrial policy from the “license-permit raj” under the previous planned system to 
industrial promotion under a more market-friendly system. Also, for other countries like Bangladesh to 
discover new export industries and strengthen domestic links, their governments cannot simply rely on 
footloose foreign investors but should nurture the industrial capabilities of indigenous enterprises. 
However, industrial policy is still biased toward market regulation. Rationalizing rules and streamlining 
administrative procedures could close the gap between industrial policy as formulated by the top 
leadership and its implementation by the bureaucracy. To fulfill the intent of the policy makers, the 
government should select or establish suitable institutions to implement the policies and give them the 
necessary authority and means to do so effectively and efficiently. 
Project implementers should also be imbued with a clear vision of the goals of the projects through 
information gathering, the drafting of practical proposals based on the information gathered, and 
mastery of the required technology. Otherwise, the implementing agencies could misunderstand the 
policy makers’ intent, make haphazard progress toward unclear goals, or revert to old rules and 
procedures. Particularly for industrial cluster development, therefore, the opinions of the local 
governments should be fully considered. However, the central bureaucracy, mistrustful of local 
capabilities, does not always grant the necessary authority and budget for project implementation, and 
without local capacity building, that prejudice is often justified.  
The authority sometimes does not go to the right administrative level and lacks the proper framework 
for its use. Vague rules and goals at the higher administrative levels make it difficult to ask 
implementers in the field to take responsibility. If the policy governance structure is inadequate, it is 
better to confine industrial policy to providing a favorable business environment, such as neutral 
incentives through fiscal or regulatory reform and the management of macroeconomic variables. More 
is required for strategic industry promotion. Without adequate institutions and implementing rules, 
industrial promotion results in waste of resources, distortion of incentives, and, worse, corruption. 
                                                            
18  Although the effectiveness of industrial policy is still a matter of controversy, governments in economies like Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, and Taipei,China have taken a strong hand in industrial promotion. See Johnson (1982) for Japan, 
Amsden (1989) for the Republic of Korea, and Wade (1990) for Taipei,China. 
19  According to Rodrik (2004), government’s strategic and coordinating role is needed because of coordination failures and 
market failures resulting from information externalities. He argues that the industrial policy debate should not be about 
whether but about how the government should be involved. 
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The next section briefly reviews the industrial policy of the Republic of Korea in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when the government actively promoted industrial development, and discusses the factors that 
enabled the country to avoid the pitfalls that prevented other countries from industrializing through 
government intervention. 
III. INDUSTRIAL POLICY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
 
Although the Korean government gave priority to export promotion throughout its period of rapid 
economic growth, its industrial policy stance changed significantly over time. The government 
maintained an import substitution regime before the 1960s by restricting imports and having an 
overvalued exchange rate. Unlike India in the 1940s and 1950s, however, the Korean government did 
not promote heavy and basic industry. Rather, the regime was an inevitable response to the supply 
shortage after the Korean War. 
Export Promotion in the 1960s 
 
The export promotion policy was launched in 1964 with exchange rate reform and the granting of 
comprehensive export promotion incentives. Exporters received various tax, tariff, and financial 
incentives, under many promotion schemes. An important incentive measure was the duty-free 
importation of raw and intermediate input materials, as well as capital equipment, for export 
production. Another was access to working capital loans, often at preferential interest rates, for export-
related activities. The short-term export credit system was streamlined so that exporters could have 
their loans automatically approved without putting up collateral. Export firms were also granted a 
reduced corporate income tax rate, wastage allowance, lower rates for electricity and rail transport, and 
export credit insurance and guarantees, among other incentives.20 
In addition, the Korean government established a framework for implementing its export promotion 
policy. It set up a monthly export promotion meeting chaired by the President and attended by high 
officials of the government and business leaders.21 At each meeting, export market trends were 
reviewed, the progress of planned policies was monitored, and the achievement of export targets set 
yearly was checked. The monthly meetings facilitated coordination among ministries, and between 
the political leadership and the private sector. The government also founded the Korea Trade 
Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) to provide market information to exporters and help them deal 
with exporting issues. To reward successful exporters, Export Day was commemorated and export 
medals were awarded. 
These policy efforts and favorable conditions in the world economy catapulted Korean exports from 
$87 million in 1963 to $3,225 million in 1973, or by 36% per year during the period. The share of 
manufacturing in production and employment also grew. Within a decade, manufacturing’s share in 
production had surpassed agriculture’s and its employment share had risen to more than 20% of total 
employment (Table 3).  
  
                                                            
20  For a detailed explanation of export incentives, see Hong (1979). 
21  The meeting was first held in 1965 and the practice lasted more than 20 years. 
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Table 3:  Economic Growth and Structural Change in the Republic of Korea 
Per Capita 
GDP  
(current $) 
Unemployment 
Rate (%) 
Exports 
($ million) 
Trade 
(% of 
GDP) 
Manufacturing  
(% of GDP) 
Manufacturing 
(% of total 
employment) 
Manufacturing 
(% of exports) 
Heavy and 
Chemical 
Industry  
(% of total 
manufacturing 
GDP) 
1953 67  12.9  15.0
1958 80  16 13.6  
1963 100 8.1 87 21.3 11.0 8.0 45.1 23.0
1968 169 5.0 455 40.6 15.0 12.8 73.9 
1973 401 3.9 3,225 63.6 22.2 13.7 84.0 39.8
1978 1,431 3.2 12,711 64.6 24.0 22.4 88.2 53.2
1983 2,076 4.1 24,445 74.9 26.4 22.5 90.9 57.6
1988 4,435 2.5 60,696 68.8 30.7 27.7 93.1 64.6
1993 8,177 2.9 82,236 54.4 26.8 24.6 93.1 70.5
1998 7,355 7.0 132,313 84.1 27.3 19.7 91.3 77.7
2003 12,717 3.4 193,817 75.8 25.8 19.0 92.7 77.6
2007 20,045 3.0 371,489 94.2 27.3 17.6 89.2 82.7
GDP = gross domestic product  
Note: The data on the share of HCI in total manufacturing GDP in the 1960s are from Kim and Roemer (1979). 
*  Figure for 1953/54.  
**Figure for 1961/62. 
Sources: GDP and trade data from the Korean National Accounts; employment data from the Korean National Statistical Office Survey on 
the Economically Active Population; manufacturing share in total exports from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 
This success was possible primarily because the promotion of labor-intensive manufacturing exports 
was consistent with the country’s comparative advantage in the 1960s. The major Korean export 
industries that decade—labor-intensive manufactured consumer goods such as textiles, plywood, and 
wigs—put the large numbers of underemployed Koreans to work and sharply reduced unemployment 
(Table 3). However, the export growth rate would not have been so high if the government had not 
sent consistent signals in support of export promotion. When the government instituted macrolevel 
reform by normalizing the exchange rate, it played the role of active promoter by providing a 
comprehensive and effective incentive system that covered tax, finance, tariff, administrative support, 
and other available measures. The policy measures were designed to allow the private sector to realize 
real benefits depending on export performance. Implementation was continuously monitored and the 
measures were adjusted when needed.22 
In the 1960s, the government was not selective in promoting industries. Incentives were given to all 
exporting companies on the basis of export performance and without discriminating among the firms. 
Therefore, the export promotion measures did not distort the market allocation much; in a sense, they 
amplified the market signals. For example, the automatic granting of export credits based on export 
performance minimized discretionary decision making by bankers and government officials. Also, tariff 
exemptions on goods imported for re-export within a specified period involved an immediate rebate 
after proof of export was presented. As mentioned earlier, the government established a public agent, 
the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA), to collect and disseminate trade and market 
information and facilitate trade by giving administrative support to exporters.  
                                                            
22  At the end of each year, the Ministry of Industry reviewed the export performance for the year and lined up the export 
targets and policies for the next year. These policies and targets were continuously monitored in the monthly meetings. 
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The Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive 
 
The Government of the Republic of Korea not only promoted exports in the 1960s but also tried to 
strengthen the country’s industrial capacity. During the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan 
period, 1962–1966, industrial development policy was focused on building basic industries, such as 
fertilizer plants and oil refineries. The policy was less narrowly defined during this period than in the 
1970s. Selective promotion was instead based on the case-by-case approval of borrowing from abroad 
and the allocation of domestic capital by the government-owned industrial development bank. However, 
as the high growth of exports of consumer goods rapidly increased the demand for intermediate and 
capital goods, the government passed a series of laws to institutionalize the promotion of selected 
industries including machinery (1967), shipbuilding (1967), textiles (1967), electronics (1969), 
petrochemicals (1970), steel (1970), and nonferrous metal smelting (1971). These laws reflected the 
government’s intention to manage the supply chain in order to relieve procurement difficulties while 
promoting import substitution of intermediate goods used in export production. To implement the 
policy, the government introduced measures such as the selective approval of foreign capital 
inducement, government guarantees for foreign borrowing, entry regulation, and tariffs to protect 
domestic industries.  
The full-blown promotion of heavy and chemical industries (HCI drive) began in 1973 with a 10-year 
industrial promotion plan and specific targets, including exports of $10 billion and per capita income of 
$1,000 by 1981. By that year, according to the plan, HCI products would compose more than 50% of 
total exports. The HCI drive was a typical state-led industrial promotion policy with a specific plan and 
tight government control over the country’s resources. The industrial policy regime in the 1970s was 
therefore more selective and interventional than the 1960s regime. The government selected the 
target industries and firms on the basis of the strategic plan, restricted entry into targeted sectors, 
provided generous financial support, guaranteed foreign exchange loans, and closely monitored the 
progress of projects. The policy did not rely on market signals and it restrained the financial markets, 
thus distorting the allocation of resources. 
The policy was a response to political and economic considerations. There was an urgent need to 
improve heavy industry, including machinery production, to reinforce national defense capabilities 
against an anticipated reduction of US troops stationed in the country. Among the economic factors 
behind the policy was the increase in imports of intermediate production input and equipment for the 
country’s growing exports, which prompted the government to consider establishing backward linkages 
to save hard currency and make the economy more self-reliant. In addition, an upgraded industry 
structure was deemed necessary to lessen the competitive pressure from emerging economies with their 
abundant cheap labor. The government decided to make a concerted push for structural transformation. 
Shipbuilding, petrochemicals, steel, machinery, nonferrous metals, and electronics were the six 
strategic industries selected for the HCI drive with Japan’s industrial transformation experience as 
benchmark.23 The government also selected private firms in these sectors, which became chaebols 
(family-controlled Korean business conglomerates), to undertake the investment needed for the 
development of the HCI sector. It provided these firms with bank loans at preferential interest rates, 
foreign loans with government guarantees, tax incentives including investment tax credits, accelerated 
depreciation allowance, and tax holidays. Of these incentives, the allocation of domestic and foreign 
                                                            
23  For details of the HCI campaign, see Kim (1988). 
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loans was the most important inducement to the private sector to undertake risky investments.24 The 
National Investment Fund was created to direct financial resources to the strategic sectors by 
controlling the credit allocation of commercial banks—a government-dictated mobilization of 
domestic financial resources that encroached on the fundamental principle of private ownership in the 
market system. The loans were mostly long-term credits with favorable rates, making the real interest 
rate negative during periods of high inflation.  
The projects in the HCI drive were massive, given the size of domestic demand in the Republic of 
Korea at that time. To secure scale economies, the government sacrificed financial distress and 
undertook the risk of underutilization. The HCI drive targeted the global market, especially as its 
concern from the start was competitiveness in the export market. However, following the second oil 
shock and setbacks in the world economy in the late 1970s, the HCI projects were found to be 
excessive and unsustainable. Major firms with idle capacity faced severe financial losses. The 
government called off the HCI drive in 1979 and shifted its policy stance toward economic 
stabilization, industrial rationalization, and trade liberalization.25 
The HCI drive achieved the planned structural transformation, but at a high cost. The HCI share of 
total manufacturing value added increased from 37.8% in 1973 to 57.6% in 1983 and per capita GDP 
improved to more than $1,000 in 1977. As Table 4 shows, the country’s commodity export profile 
changed over time, from labor-intensive light industry to high-value-added industry.  
 
Table 4: Top 10 Export Commodities of the Republic of Korea, 1961–1993 ($ million) 
1961 1970 1980 1985 1993
1 Iron ore 5.3 Textiles 341 Textiles 5,014 Textiles 7,004 Electronics 24,233 
2 Tungsten 5.1 Plywood 92 Electronics 2,004 Ships 5,040 Textiles 15,877 
3 Raw silk 2.7 Wigs 90 Steel 1,854 Electronics 4,286 Steel 6,612 
4 Anthracite 2.4 Iron ore 49 Footwear 904 Steel 2,582 Chemicals 4,634 
5 Cuttlefish 2.3 Electronics 29 Ships 618 Footwear 1,571 Automobiles 4,493 
6 Other fish 1.9 Vegetables 19 Plastic products 531 
Fish and 
shellfish 891 Ships 3,727 
7 Graphite 1.7 Footwear 17 Metal products 433 Machinery 845 Machinery 3,055 
8 Plywood 1.4 Tobacco 13 Plywood 352 Automobiles 768 Footwear 2,309 
9 Cereals 1.4 Steel 13 Ocean fish 352 Plastic products 741 
Petroleum 
products 1,795 
10 Skins 1.2 Metal products 12 
Electric 
appliances 324 
Electric 
appliances 609 
Plastic 
products 1,503 
  Total  25.3 Total 660.6 Total               24,337 Total                 52,875  Total                     68,238 
  share of above 
(%) 
62   77   80   81   83 
Source: Hong (1994). 
                                                            
24  Unlike the light industries, the heavy and chemical industries required huge amounts of capital and more sophisticated 
technologies. Gestation periods were also much longer. Therefore, when the policy was launched, some firms were 
hesitant to invest. 
25  The new government that came into power in 1980 was met with an economic crisis: negative economic growth for the 
first time since the 1960s, external imbalances with huge foreign debts, and macroeconomic instability with high inflation. 
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Aftermath of the Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive 
 
The new government took several measures to rationalize industry. In 1986, it streamlined the 
industrial policy by replacing the seven individual industry promotion laws with the Industrial 
Development Act. The industrial policy regime changed from selective industrial promotion to 
intervention for industrial rationalization in areas where market failure had occurred. Specialization 
was encouraged through incentives designed to promote technological advancement. The National 
Research and Development Project was started to fund public as well as public–private R&D projects. 
In the 1980s, private R&D expenditure expanded rapidly. Amid growing concern over economic 
concentration, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act was passed in 1980 and the Fair Trade 
Commission was established in 1981 to regulate economic competition. 
Policy measures to protect and support small and medium enterprises (SMEs) were also initiated. 
SMEs were relatively neglected under the HCI drive but now began to receive more attention from the 
government.26 The Korea Credit Guarantee Fund was established in 1976 to relieve the financial 
constraints of SMEs. To modernize the SMEs, the government induced them to specialize in the 
production of parts and components and to strengthen their links with big enterprises in strategic 
sectors. In 1978, the government passed the Small and Medium Business (SMB) Promotion Act and 
established the SME Promotion Fund. The SMB Corporation, founded in 1979, operated and managed 
the SME Promotion Fund, which has become a major policy vehicle for SME promotion in the Republic 
of Korea. 
Although the HCI drive achieved the goal of transforming the industrial structure and increasing value 
addition and capital intensity, problems of macroeconomic instability, financial distortion, and 
economic concentration in large conglomerates surfaced and continued to affect the economy 
thereafter. Interventionists, such as Amsden (1989), argue, however, that the country could not have 
attained its economic prowess without government intervention. Unlike the promotion of labor-
intensive industries, the promotion of heavy and chemical industries brings about problems of 
coordination, information, risk management, and financing, which require government to take an 
active role. 
The next section traces the growth of industrial cluster development policy in the Republic of Korea, 
chiefly the construction of industrial parks in the 1960s and 1970s. 
  
                                                            
26  The SME sector was considered important from the early stages of the country’s economic development. The 
government passed the Small and Medium Enterprise Cooperatives Act in 1961 and established the Industrial Bank of 
Korea specifically for SMEs. In view of the rise in exports of SME-dominated light industry, an SME department was 
created under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 1968. Even after the HCI drive had begun, the government 
introduced a plan to modernize SMEs and set up an agency for SME standardization and quality management. However, 
the HCI drive with its concentration of financial resources in selected big enterprises resulted in high inflation and the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, and a deteriorating business environment for SMEs, in the late 1970s. 
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IV. INDUSTRIAL CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE 
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
 
The clustering phenomenon owes much of its present day importance to Porter (1990), who argued 
for the formation of industrial clusters to improve competitiveness. The industrial parks that were built 
in the Republic of Korea, particularly the large industrial complexes that emerged during the HCI drive 
in the 1970s, were based on the cluster concept, even though the term “cluster” was not explicitly 
mentioned. The term came into wide use in the Korean policy arena in the late 1990s as the 
government paid more attention to promoting regional industries. This section presents the industrial 
cluster development experience of the Republic of Korea together with the evolution of the country’s 
industrial parks and related policies.27 
An industrial park is a planned site that is developed and managed to provide industrial location. Unlike 
areas where firms naturally locate chiefly to be close to suppliers and markets, industrial parks require 
deliberate effort: feasibility studies, master planning, construction, and follow-up management. In the 
Republic of Korea, most industrial parks were developed by the government. The development of 
industrial parks therefore reflected the government’s policy intent and evolved as the industrial policy 
regime changed.  
As discussed in the previous section, the Republic of Korea significantly reworked its industrial policy 
over time. Three distinct phases of industrial policy marked the period of high industrialization from 
the 1960s to the 1980s. In the 1960s, the main policy concern was promoting labor-intensive export 
industries as well as basic industrial production. In the 1970s, the government aggressively pursued a 
selective industrial policy. In the 1980s, it moved away from an active industrial policy and toward 
industrial rationalization and innovation. Korean industrial policy later focused on restoring balanced 
development by promoting SMEs and regional economic activities. The change in industrial policy was 
accompanied by a shift in industrial location policy. Table 5 summarizes the evolution of the Republic 
of Korea's  industrial location policy. 
  
                                                            
27   For a detailed history of industrial park development in the Republic of Korea, see Park (2010) and Cho (2011). 
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Table 5: Evolution of Industrial Location Policies in the Republic of Korea 
Item 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Industrial 
policy regime 
Promotion of  
light-industry 
exports 
 
Heavy
and chemical 
industry 
promotion 
Industrial
rationalization 
Industrial 
restructuring 
after crisis  
Innovation-led
regional 
industrial 
development 
Location 
policy 
Development of 
industrial park for 
exporting industries  
Development
of large-scale 
industrial 
complexes 
 
Development of 
rural and regional 
industrial parks for 
balanced national 
development  
Diversification in 
types of  
locations and 
relaxation of  
regulations on 
locations  
Development 
of specialized 
regional 
clusters and  
innovative 
capability of 
existing 
parks 
Development 
of industrial 
parks 
Ulsan Industrial 
Park, Korea Export 
Industrial Park near 
Seoul 
Large-scale
industrial complexes 
on southeastern 
coast (Pohang, Ulsan 
Changwon, Yeosu, 
Gumi), 
free-trade zone 
(Masan)  
Industrial parks in 
southwestern 
region, rural 
industrial parks  
High-tech 
science industrial 
parks, urban 
apartment-type 
plants (“flatted” 
factories)  
Urban high-
tech industrial 
parks, foreign 
investment 
zones 
Legal basis 
and 
institutions 
 
Urban Planning Act, 
Act on the 
Development of 
Export Industrial 
Parks, Act on 
Special Cases 
Concerning the 
Acquisition of 
Industrial Sites  
Comprehensive Plan 
on National 
Territory, Local 
Industry 
Development Act, 
Industrial  
Park (IP) 
Development 
Promotion Act, 
Industrial Park 
Development 
Corporation, 
Regional IP 
Management 
Corporation 
Capital Region
Readjustment 
Planning Act, 
Industrial Site and 
Development 
Act,*  
Act on Industrial 
Agglomeration 
Promotion and 
Factory 
Establishment* 
 
Act on Special 
Cases Concerning 
the Support for 
Techno Industrial 
Districts, 
Korea Industrial 
Complex 
Corporation 
Act on Planning
and Utilization 
of National 
Territory, 
Special Act on 
Balanced 
National 
Development 
* Passed in 1990. 
Source: Author’s summary. 
 
Development of Export Industrial Parks in the 1960s 
 
The promotion of exports of labor-intensive consumer goods led to the construction of industrial 
parks for light industry near the Seoul area, where business services and labor were readily available. 
The Guro Industrial Park, officially named the Korea Export Industrial Park, was originally developed by 
Korean–Japanese entrepreneurs, but after the private sector–led project stalled, the government took 
over its development in 1964 and later built other industrial parks in nearby areas and in other major 
cities in the country.28 The Ulsan Industrial Park was the first designated location for heavy and 
chemical industries, such as oil refineries, steel, and fertilizer plants. 
                                                            
28  For the development of industrial parks in Guro, Ulsan, Changwon, and Gumi and the history of industrial park 
development in the Republic of Korea, see Cho (2011). 
Lessons for South Asia from the Industrial Cluster Development Experience 17 
 
 
In the 1960s, the legal basis was set for industrial site development. The Urban Planning Act of 1962 
defined the scope of urban planning, and the National Land Planning Act, passed in 1963, provided the 
legal framework for the use and development of national land. Legislation specific to industrial parks 
was based on these land-use laws. In the 1960s, the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Acquisition 
of Industrial Sites was passed to speed up the development of industrial parks. Designated areas no 
longer had to be approved under the Act on Land Acquisition and the land acquisition process was 
shortened.29  
Rising wages and shortages in intermediate goods in the late 1960s induced the government to 
promote selected industries, such as machinery, shipbuilding, textiles, electronics, petrochemicals, 
steel, and nonferrous metals. Legislation promoting each industry was passed, and industrial parks 
were designated for the selected industries. Pohang was chosen for the steel industry in 1967; Gumi, for 
the electronics industry, in 1969. The development of the industrial parks for these key industries 
reached full scale in the 1970s with the HCI drive. As massive investment projects were launched, the 
government’s industrial location policy also changed considerably. Large-scale industrial complexes 
began to take shape along the southeastern coast of the country under a comprehensive, long-term 
plan. 
Growth-Pole Development Strategy of the 1970s 
 
Industrial location policy during the HCI drive was based on the so-called growth-pole development 
strategy, which gathered together related production activities in a designated area to maximize 
development effects through industrial clustering. The comprehensive strategy called for the 
development of three industrial belts covering all potential industrial areas. The industrial belt along 
the southeastern coast, connecting Pohang (steel), Ulsan (petrochemicals), Onsan (nonferrous 
metals), Masan (free-trade zone), Geoje (shipbuilding), and Yeosu (petrochemicals), was developed 
first, in the 1970s. Gumi, located inland in Gyeongbuk Province, was also developed for the electronics 
industry.30 Site selection criteria included physical conditions, such as the availability of ports, water 
supply, and enough space for large-scale production. 
The government’s first Comprehensive National Territorial Development Plan (1972–1981) served as a 
road map for land development policies in the 1970s. It dealt mainly with large-scale infrastructure and 
industrial sites for strategic industries under the HCI drive, particularly transport, energy, and water 
infrastructure for industrial park development. The Ministry of Construction chose the sites and built 
the infrastructure, achieved the passage of the Industrial Park Development Promotion Act in 1973, 
and set up the Industrial Park Development Corporation (renamed the Korea Water Resources 
Corporation) in 1974 for the construction of industrial complexes. Construction was tightly monitored 
by the Heavy and Chemical Industry Promotion Committee, in which related ministries, including the 
Ministry of Construction, were represented. 
Despite the adoption of a selective industrial promotion policy in the 1970s, efforts to develop export-
oriented local industrial parks for light industry continued. To strengthen administrative, tax, and 
financial incentives for these parks, the Local Industrial Development Act, which promoted the 
nationwide dispersion of industrial parks and defined related legal matters, was passed in 1970. 
Superseding the regulation of local industrial park development by the Urban Planning Act in the 
1960s, the new law provided for administrative and financial support from the government under a 
                                                            
29  Committee for the Sixty-Year History of the Korean Economy (2010). 
30  The two other industrial belts were those in Incheon–Pyeongtaek, for industries relocated from the congested Seoul area, 
and in the southwestern area of the country, covering the cities of Gunsan, Janghang, Biyin, Yeosu, and Mokpo. 
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comprehensive and unified system, relieving the financial burden of local governments after the 
private sector–led development boom of the 1960s.  
Balanced Development Policy in the 1980s 
 
In the 1980s, the Korean government turned away from its massive HCI drive and toward stability and 
balance, choosing to rationalize industries with idle capacity rather than engage in selective promotion. 
The second Comprehensive Plan on National Territory (1982–1991) reflected this change in policy 
regime. To reduce regional disparities resulting from the growth-pole approach of the HCI drive, the 
government promoted small and medium-sized industrial parks in the provinces and restricted the 
development of industrial sites in the Seoul area under the Capital Region Readjustment Planning Act 
of 1983. The Banwol–Siwha and Namdong industrial parks were developed in the coastal area west of 
Seoul, mostly for small and medium-sized factories, and other industrial parks were set up in relatively 
underdeveloped regions of Gunjang, Gunsan, and Daebul, in the central and southwestern regions of 
the country, in the late 1980s. But these parks, developed in haste, stayed mostly unoccupied for a long 
time. The government tried to increase industrial activity in the rural areas by developing rural 
industrial parks to give farmers a new source of income. 
Reinventing Industrial Clusters in the 1990s and 2000s 
 
In the 1990s, as industrial policy paid more attention to industrial competitiveness and R&D, diverse 
new needs arose, demanding a fitting response from industrial location policy. Industrial districts began 
to include business services such as R&D, logistics, and workers’ welfare, as well as production. Various 
types of small and medium industrial sites, such as parks for lease and apartment-type “flatted” 
factories in urban areas, sprang up. Innovation-oriented industrial parks, such as the Gwangju High-
Tech Science Industrial Park, and six local science industrial parks accompanied the rise of the IT 
industry. The legal framework for industrial location was revised at this time to accommodate the 
changing industrial structure. Various laws were integrated and regulations abolished to facilitate the 
development of industrial parks and the construction of factories. The Industrial Sites and 
Development Act and the Industrial Placement and Factory Construction Act (later renamed the 
Industrial Cluster Placement and Factory Establishment Act) were passed in 1990. These provide the 
legal basis for current industrial location policy in the Government of the Republic of Korea. 
In the 2000s, the major policy concern was reducing regional and sectoral disparities and 
strengthening industry innovation. To answer the growing need for functions associated with R&D, 
marketing, and welfare in industrial sites, and for space for new industries, such as software and 
biotech, the government introduced various support measures and developed industrial sites tailored 
to the specific requirements of industries. Small-scale, high-tech industrial parks were built in urban 
areas so that small businesses could use them at low cost. In addition, various policy efforts were made 
to revive old industrial parks and improve their competitiveness, foster clusters of innovation, and build 
networks with research and academic institutions. Policy measures intended to renovate sites and 
make them more environment friendly were also initiated. 
To summarize, the development of planned locations for industrial activities in the Republic of Korea 
provided not only physical space but also a favorable environment for manufacturing firms. In the 
1960s and 1970s, the selection of locations for industrial parks was made solely according to economic 
efficiency criteria, following the growth-pole approach, rather than political considerations. Large-scale 
industrial complexes accommodated clusters of factories linked in selected strategic industries. This 
industrial location policy conforming to a comprehensive, long-term plan for the development of 
national territory, was systematically pursued. As more technology-intensive industries emerged, the 
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policy gained in sophistication and allowed the establishment of various types of industrial parks to 
meet the needs of the new industries. 
As a result, the number of manufacturing establishments and employees in industrial parks has 
increased dramatically, as Table 6 shows. In 2008, more than 15% of all manufacturing establishments 
and about 45% of total manufacturing employment in the Republic of Korea were located in industrial 
parks, which accounted for about 60% of the country’s total production and 72% of its total exports 
that year.31 Clearly, the establishments in the industrial parks are much more productive than those in 
individual locations. The large-scale industrial complexes developed in the HCI drive, in particular, 
have been a force for the country’s export growth. The top-five industries in national industrial parks 
are petrochemicals, steel, machinery, electricity and electronics, and transportation equipment. As of 
2013, the Republic of Korea had 41 national industrial complexes, 510 local industrial parks, 11 urban 
high-tech industrial parks, and 447 rural industrial parks. The industrial parks accommodated 78,228 
manufacturing establishments and about 2 million workers, and had an occupancy rate of 94.7%.32 
Table 6: Contribution of Industrial Parks to Manufacturing 
in the Republic of Korea, 1970–2008 
Year 
Industrial Parks (A) Total Manufacturing (B) Percentage (A/B) 
No. of 
Establishments 
No. of 
Employees 
No. of 
Establishments
No. of 
Employees 
Share (%) in 
Establishments 
Share (%) 
in 
Employees 
1970 703 19,782 24,114 861,041 2.9 2.3 
1974 1,119 259,584 22,787 1,369,677 4.6 19.0 
1980 2,649 373,282 70,455 3,080,202 12.0 27.2 
1987 8,434 1,052,900 44,037 2,528,522 15.0 34.0 
1990 8,445 838,573 70,455 3,080,202 12.0 27.2 
1995 12,471 918,332 97,284 2,981,813 12.8 30.8 
2000 27,287 991,078 98,110 2,652,590 8.7 29.7 
2005 36,605 1,216,455 117,205 2,865,549 11.0 35.6 
2008 53,803 1,474,410 320,053 3,277,271 16.8 45.0 
Source: Cho (2011), from the Korean statistical database and the statistical database on Korean industrial parks.  
 
Section V, which ends this report, summarizes the factors responsible for the success of the Korean 
industrial cluster development experience and draws lessons for South Asia.  
 
  
                                                            
31  Park (2010). 
32  KICOX (2013). 
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V. SUCCESS FACTORS AND LESSONS FOR SOUTH ASIA 
 
The qualities of Korean industrial promotion that spurred the growth of indigenous private enterprises 
became ingrained in the national mind set as an aggressive approach to industrial upgrading. Economic 
growth under the market-based system turned out successful, fast-growing enterprises. The HCI drive 
helped these enterprises enter into new lines of business across industries and form groups that 
eventually became large business conglomerates. The chaebols, in a sense, substituted for the state 
enterprise system in overcoming market deficiencies by internalizing coordination externalities and 
diversifying risks. Conglomerates that consistently performed as expected by the government were 
granted various incentives, such as subsidies, credits, and administrative support.  
Policy making and implementation in the Republic of Korea, including the selection of sectors and 
locations for industrial promotion, were not much affected by political interests. This would not have 
been possible without strong political leadership. Insulated from the influence of interest groups, the 
technocrats were free to make policy decisions mainly on technical grounds. Top policy makers kept 
open communication lines with the President, who continuously monitored their activities. They also 
stayed fairly long in office despite changes in the political situation, making decisions that were 
consistent with long-term development strategies. 
Industrial Policy in the Republic of Korea: Success Factors 
 
The key factors that contributed to the success of industrial policy in the Government of the Republic 
of Korea fall into two categories: export orientation and policy effectiveness. The country’s export 
orientation exerted sustained competitive pressure on companies and pushed them to continue 
learning and to adapt. In addition, the Korean government effectively implemented the policy once its 
direction was set.33 Export performance provided an objective criterion for government support. 
Despite the change in policy regime to import substitution in the 1970s, export-oriented development 
was still the top policy priority and various factors worked to soften the negative effects of distortive 
intervention.34 
Outward-Oriented Industrial Promotion 
The large production quantities in the heavy and chemical industries did not allow the Republic of 
Korea with its small domestic market to exploit economies of scale. The HCI drive scaled up the 
project size and explicitly provided for an increase in the export share of promoted industries. Whether 
intentionally or not, this export orientation helped reduce the protectionism innate in import 
substitution policy. It also helped the country restore its external balance after the economic crises of 
1980 and 1997. The depreciation of the Korean won boosted the economy and produced the hard 
currency needed to gain the confidence of foreign investors. 
  
                                                            
33  For an overview of the role of the state, see Perkins (1997). For the country’s industrial and trade policy, see Ahn and Kim 
(1997). 
34  The arguments in this section on factors mitigating the negative effects of intervention in industry are based on Kim, 
Huong, and Trang (2011). 
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Adequate Selection of Industries for Promotion 
The selection of promoted sectors was consistent with the evolving comparative advantage of the 
Government of the Republic of Korea. Among the six strategic industries, the relatively labor-intensive 
shipbuilding and electronics sectors were areas where the country could readily compete, given its 
adequate supply of well-trained workers. Steel, petrochemicals, and nonferrous metals, on the other 
hand, were industries with rising domestic demand due to the rapid growth in exports. Finally, the 
machinery industry, where domestic demand was also mounting, was especially important because of 
its relationship with the defense industry. Policy makers considered the industry critical to the 
improvement of the country’s engineering capability. The HCI drive was pursued with careful 
consideration of demand and industry linkages. The growth of labor-intensive industries induced an 
increase in intermediate input and equipment imports, which became targets for promotion. Other 
countries that rushed to promote upstream industries without considering industrial linkages and market 
conditions were less successful.  
Private Enterprise–Oriented Promotion 
Unlike other countries that relied solely on state-owned enterprises to engage in industrial promotion, 
the Government of the Republic of Korea empowered private enterprises. The government took the 
first step, and the private sector managed the businesses.35 The market system gave private enterprises 
strong motivation—the prospect of financial gain—to perform well. Government actively invested in 
infrastructure and big projects, designed major industrial policies, and induced the private sector to 
follow the policy directions. 
Consistent Policy Signals with Comprehensive and Effective Incentives 
The Korean government maintained consistency in its policy signals. Its measures were not 
fragmented or nominal, but comprehensive and effective. 36 The system of incentives covered all 
available measures, such as tax, finance, tariff, and administrative support. For the HCI drive, the major 
tool of government was the allocation of financial resources. When there was chronic excess demand 
for financial resources, the accessibility of bank loans itself created huge rents. Interest rates were kept 
lower than curb market rates or market clearing rates. 
The Korean government was both an active promoter of industrial development and a regulator, 
allocating scarce resources on the basis of its plan for promoting strategic industries. It was aware that 
policy implementation was as important as policy design and that it had to adjust policy measures as 
conditions changed. Poor management and corruption could distort policy intentions and lead to 
waste and rent-seeking behavior. In the 1970s, particularly with its resources being allocated on the 
basis of export performance rather than transparent criteria, the government had more room to fail. It 
responded with concrete policy measures and specific expenditure targets, and with proper 
management and constant monitoring of implementation.  
  
                                                            
35  This is not saying that all projects were undertaken by the private sector. The Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) 
was a state-owned enterprise until recently. 
36  The Government of the Republic of Korea used both sticks and carrots. It threatened to withdraw bank loans if firms did 
not meet the expectations of policy makers. The government also exerted competitive pressure by allowing rivalry among 
leading companies. 
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Effective Policy Implementation 
Through its institutional arrangements, the Government of the Republic of Korea eased 
communication and coordination in policy design and implementation. It created the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) in 1961, and appointed its head as deputy prime minister with authority over 
other ministers. The EPB centralized policy coordination: it prepared the budget, collected statistics, 
and drafted and implemented development plans. Other ministries were involved in daily operations; 
the EPB, on the other hand, had a long-term economic focus and coordinated policy measures to make 
them consistent with long-term strategies. The second 5-year economic plan (1967–1971) explicitly 
stated that the EPB was responsible for implementing, managing, and coordinating the plan.  
The EPB functioned as the seat of government control. It dictated the allocation of the development 
budget and, by designing the overall budget plan, with which the annual budget and the foreign 
exchange and investment allocation plans had to comply, it determined the overall allocation of the 
country’s resources. Firms seeking foreign loans for their projects had to apply for approval from the 
EPB. The Ministry of Commerce, Industry advised the EPB on the technical content of the proposed 
projects, while the Ministry of Finance reviewed the financial status of the borrowing firms. Through 
the Deliberation Council for Foreign Capital Mobilization, the EPB determined the appropriate amount 
of foreign loans for each application, in line with policy priorities.37 
The 5-year economic development plan itself was less crucial; it served more as a means of 
communication among relevant entities. During plan preparation, information was shared among 
ministries and the private sector. Ministries learned about one another’s concerns and issues and the 
country’s long-term goals. The private sector, in turn, familiarized itself with the government’s policy 
orientation.38 
Under the government’s formal system of monitoring and evaluation, each ministry or agency 
submitted an annual management plan to the Office of Planning Coordination (OPC) in the Prime 
Minister’s Office. Each ministry monitored and evaluated all projects and programs specified in its 
management plan and reported each quarter to the OPC, which submitted an overall quarterly 
report to the President. The OPC was replaced in 1981 by the Bureau of Evaluation and Analysis 
under the EPB.39 
Strong Political Leadership 
Although the EPB was in charge of the overall economic development plan, the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry gained an expanded role with the passage of industrial promotion 
legislation in the late 1960s. The ministry introduced entry restrictions, protective tariffs, foreign 
investment screening based on technical content, and other measures. When the HCI drive was 
launched in 1973, a task force, the Heavy and Chemical Industry Promotion Committee, was created 
under the direct supervision of the President. The HCI drive was conceived as a long-term 
investment plan with concrete and detailed investment projects, such as the construction of large 
industrial complexes. In contrast to the 5-year plan controlled by economic specialists in the EPB, 
the HCI drive was managed by engineering and construction bureaucrats with technical knowledge 
                                                            
37  Unlike the PRC, which relied on FDI for industrial development, the Republic of Korea used foreign financing, such as 
foreign bank loans. It accumulated a large amount of foreign debt in the late 1970s and encountered a debt problem. 
However, the export boom in the last half of the 1980s relieved the country of its foreign debt problem. 
38  The role of planning in communication is pointed out by SaKong (1993). 
39  For a discussion of indicative planning in the Republic of Korea, see Kuznets (1990). 
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of industrial promotion.40 The task force relayed the needs of industry to the President. But EPB 
concerns about macroeconomic instability and economic imbalance due to the massive size of the 
HCI drive led to the dissolution of the task force in 1980. 
Industrial Cluster Development in the Republic of Korea: Success Factors  
 
The development of industrial parks in the Government of the Republic of Korea provided industry 
with competitive production locations at low cost.41 The Korean government not only made physical 
space available but also continuously tried to develop industrial clusters where the resident firms were 
supported by business services linked together in a supply chain. The rise of major large-scale 
industrial complexes was accompanied by complementary efforts to strengthen research and human 
resource capabilities in the various regions. The government encouraged universities and technical 
schools located near industrial parks to serve as specialized R&D, education, and training institutes for 
the selected industries.  
Substantial Support from the Government 
The development of large industrial complexes in the 1970s was a national project that had the full 
support of the government. The Ministry of Construction prepared the master plan for the 
construction of the complexes, while the Ministry of Commerce and Industry selected the firms that 
would reside in the parks and set guidelines for park management. EPB and the Ministry of Finance 
drew up the financing plan, and the Ministry of Science and Technology prepared a human resource 
development plan for the supply of technical manpower to the resident firms. The government 
established the Korea Industrial Complex Corporation (KICOX), a state-owned corporation, to carry 
out the construction work. KICOX was authorized to expropriate land, make loans, and grant tax 
exemptions.  
The construction of industrial parks was the major undertaking under the HCI drive. The nine 
industrial parks built by the government in 1973–1979 accounted for 36% of the total government 
spending on the HCI drive. The government planned to invest up to $96 billion in 1973–1981—an 
unprecedentedly large amount in relation to the country’s GDP of $138 billion in 1973—to promote the 
six strategic industries. The National Investment Fund was created to mobilize domestic capital. The 
fund mobilized about 12% of the country’s money (M3) growth in 1974–1981 and allocated about 55% of 
its resources to the construction of heavy and chemical industry production bases and the domestic 
purchase of machinery. Firms investing in the heavy and chemical industries were given substantial 
fiscal incentives, including tax exemptions (100% for the first 3 years and 50% for the next 3 years), 
investment tax credits (8%–9%), and accelerated depreciation (100%). The effective marginal 
corporate tax rates in 1975–1981 were around 15%–20% for heavy and chemical industries, and around 
48%–52% for other industries.42 
  
                                                            
40  This feature of the HCI drive’s governance structure was pointed out by Park (2011). 
41  The government bore the cost of basic infrastructure. 
42  Kim (2001). 
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Effective Incentives for Industrial Park Development 
The Government of the Republic of Korea introduced various incentives to make it possible for private 
developers and local governments to put up industrial sites, and firms to move into the parks. It eased 
restrictions on land acquisition and reduced red tape connected with the approval of construction and 
matters related to urban planning and the environment. It also paid for part of the infrastructure in the 
industrial parks, such as roads, water supply lines, and sewerage, and subsidized the purchase of land 
for special purposes, such as urban apartment-type factories, rural industrial sites, and industrial parks 
for lease. Developers received tax incentives, such as exemption from land acquisition tax, registration 
tax, and property tax. Acquisition and registration tax exemption and partial relief from property tax 
were extended as well to firms to induce them to locate in the industrial parks. In addition, preferential 
loan arrangements were made available at the time of site purchase. Figure 2 shows the current 
support system for industrial park development in the Republic of Korea. 
 
Adequate Legal Framework of Support 
The country’s industrial cluster development laws (Table 7) give details of the government incentives 
and regulations. Currently, the Framework Act on National Territory (2002), with its long-term vision 
of national land utilization, is the highest-level and basic framework of land use. The Act on Planning 
and Use of National Territory (2003), based on the framework law, provides the regulatory framework 
Figure 2: Support System for the Development of Industrial Parks 
in the Republic of Korea 
Source: KICOX (2013). 
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for the location of industry and facilities, land use, and environmental conservation.43 The Capital 
Region Readjustment Planning Act was passed in 1983 to deconcentrate industries in Seoul by 
regulating the construction of production facilities in the metropolitan area, including Gyeonggi 
Province, which surrounds Seoul.  
Table 7: Legal Foundation of Industrial Cluster Development and Management 
in the Republic of Korea 
Item Legal Foundation Implementation 
Framework Framework Act on National Territory
Land-use 
regulation 
  
Act on Planning and Use of National Territory Urban planning, Comprehensive National 
Territorial Plans 
Capital Region Readjustment Planning Act Capital region readjustment planning
Industrial park 
development 
and 
management 
Industrial Sites and Development Act Industrial site supply plans 
Act on Industrial Agglomeration Promotion and Factory 
Establishment 
Framework Plan for Industrial Agglomeration 
Promotion 
Special- 
purpose 
planned 
locations 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Special Act on Designation and Management of Free 
Economic Zones 
Free economic zones 
Free Trade Zone Act Free-trade zones 
Foreign Trade Promotion Act Foreign investment zones 
Special Act on Enterprise City Development Enterprise cities 
SME Promotion Act SME collaboration parks 
Framework Act on Science and Technology Science and technology parks 
Act on Special Cases Concerning Support for Industrial 
Technology Parks 
Industrial technology parks 
Software Industry Promotion Act Software promotion parks 
Cultural Industry Promotion Act (1999) Cultural industry parks 
Act on Development and Management of Physical 
Distribution Facilities 
Distribution parks 
High-Tech Medical Complex Act High-tech medical complexes 
SME = small and medium enterprise. 
Source: KICOX (2013). 
  
Two laws guide industrial park development and management in the Republic of Korea. The Industrial 
Sites and Development Act (1990) concerns the designation and development of national and local 
industrial parks, and the Act on Industrial Agglomeration Promotion and Factory Establishment (1990) 
provides the legal basis for the management of developed industrial parks and the promotion of 
industrial clusters.44 The country gradually streamlined its legal framework for industrial cluster 
development by integrating and simplifying the individual laws. 
  
                                                            
43  The Act on Planning and Use of National Territory integrated the two basic laws on land use—the Urban Planning Act 
(1962) and the National Land Use and Management Act (1973)—which guided industrial cluster development in the 
Republic of Korea before 2003. 
44  KICOX (2013). 
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Customized Support System 
Special-purpose industrial sites, such as free-trade zones, were also introduced, through the 
passage of the Free Export Zone Act (since renamed the Free Trade Zone Act) in 1970. The first 
free export zone was developed in Masan. It attracted foreign investment in labor-intensive export 
production industries, such as electronics, and had a major spillover effect on local industries 
through industry linkages. New types of industrial parks, such as urban high-tech parks and 
apartment-type “flatted” factories, were developed in response to changing demand as the 
country progressed into high-tech industries. Industrial parks for SME agglomeration were built to 
promote the clustering of SMEs. The country also developed science research parks and special 
districts for R&D to promote industry innovation. For each special-purpose industrial site, 
individual legislation specifying customized regulations and incentives designed to achieve the 
purpose of the cluster was passed (Table 7). For instance, the Ministry of Science and Technology 
was given jurisdiction over science and technology parks.  
Long-Term Plan for Industrial Cluster Development 
A long-term plan, with a comprehensive and detailed vision closely aligned with the country’s long-
term economic development policy for national strategic industries, was drawn up for industrial 
cluster development in the Republic of Korea. Large-scale heavy and chemical industrial parks built 
in the 1970s are still expanding in accordance with the long-term plan. For example, the construction 
of Gumi Industrial Park began in 1968 specifically for the electronics industry under the Electronics 
Industry Promotion Act (1969). With the launch of the HCI drive in the 1970s, the development of 
industrial parks received vigorous support from the government. As soon as Park 1, the first site of 
Gumi Industrial Park was completed, the government planned its expansion and the development of 
residential areas. Park 2 was designated in the mid-1970s for industries that were relatively new to 
the Republic of Korea, such as semiconductors, personal computers, and precision instruments. Park 
3 was completed in 1995, and Park 4 is under construction and is expected to be completed in 2015. 
Other industrial complexes similarly went through long-term development. The Pohang Steel 
Industrial Park project was planned for 1975–2020; the Changwon Industrial Complex project, for 
1974–2015.45 The Changwon complex includes not only industrial sites but also large-scale urban 
area development, and thus reserved sizable land for expansion from the start. Once the industrial 
parks were established and running successfully, specialized firms linked with the resident 
companies were invited to locate in the park.  
For the development of other, relatively smaller industrial parks, the Industrial Location Policy 
Deliberation Committee of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport prepares 10-year supply 
plans for the industrial sites. The committee set up a local industry location subcommittee to hear the 
views of heads of local government. Special-purpose industrial clusters comply with individual laws 
under the jurisdiction of the ministries concerned. The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy prepares 
5-year plans for the promotion of industrial clusters, which include the promising sectors selected for 
regional industrial clusters, supply plans for the industrial sites, human resource recruitment and 
development programs, and plans for related social overhead capitals. The plans also define support 
for the restructuring of clusters with sunset industries. 
  
                                                            
45  Committee for the Sixty-Year History of the Korean Economy (2010). 
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Specialized Agencies for Industrial Cluster Development 
Besides establishing laws and systems, the government set up specialized public agencies with the sole 
task of developing and managing industrial parks, and gave them the authority as well as the 
responsibility to undertake industrial cluster development. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and 
Transport designates planned locations, including industrial parks, and develops the land; the Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Energy develops and manages industrial clusters.46 The Korea Land and 
Housing Corporation (established as the Land Fund in 1975) under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure 
and Transport administers the acquisition, use, and supply of land for public purposes, and KICOX 
under the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy is in charge of developing and managing national 
industrial parks. The establishment of affiliated public agencies with specific missions improved the 
effectiveness of policy implementation particularly as these agencies accumulated the necessary 
expertise and know-how to carry out the policy. 
The first public agency for industrial park development and management was the Korea Export 
Industrial Corporation. It was set up in 1964 to take over the development of the Guro Industrial Park. 
The agency oversaw that industrial park project and successfully attracted firms spread over the Seoul 
area to the park by providing various export-related services. As demand for production sites grew, it 
also managed the expansion of the industrial park and the development of other parks in Bupyeong 
and Juan, near Seoul. The major export commodities in the parks were textiles and clothing. Recently, 
the Guro Industrial Park has been transformed into a park for high-tech companies in the digital 
technology industry under a new name, Seoul Digital Industrial Park.  
At the start of industrial park development, the government’s attention was focused on building 
infrastructure and developing industrial sites. With the completion of the construction work, the 
government concerned itself more with stabilizing and managing the operation of the parks. While 
efficient management of the industrial parks is critical to their success, monitoring the use of the sites 
by the resident firms to make sure that it accords with the conditions of residence is no less important.  
To institute orderly systems for managing the industrial clusters, the Government of the Republic of 
Korea created specialized industrial park management agencies at the start of development. The Korea 
Export Industrial Corporation administered the construction and management of the Korean Export 
Industrial Park. It also managed the industrial parks in Guro, Bupyeong, Juan, and Namdong in Seoul, 
and the Gyeonggi area. The Jungbu Industrial Park Management Corporation (later the Gumi 
Industrial Park Management Corporation) was formed in 1971 to manage the sale of sites and stabilize 
operations at the park. The Southeast Regional Industrial Park Management Corporation first managed 
the operation of Changwon Industrial Park and later became responsible for managing other industrial 
parks on the southeastern coast, such as Ulsan and Onsan. More management agencies were set up as 
industrial park development spread toward less developed regions. The West Regional Industrial Park 
Management Corporation was established in 1977 to manage the Banwol, Sihwa, and Asan industrial 
parks, and the Southwest Regional Industrial Park Management Corporation in 1990, for the industrial 
parks in Yeosu, Gwangju, Gunsan, and Gunjang. These various management corporations were merged 
into KICOX in 1997.47  
                                                            
46  The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport was previously the Ministry of Construction and Transportation. 
The Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy has been variously known as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade.  
47  Information about the history of the development of the Republic of Korea’s industrial park management system was 
obtained from the KICOX website (http://www.kicox.or.kr/home/eng/history/history.jsp). 
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The centralization was intended to streamline national industrial park management and upgrading, 
consistent with national policies. KICOX consolidated the five regional industrial management 
corporations and took over the operations of foreign investment zones and special-purpose industrial 
clusters, such as the Osong Bio-Health Science Park. It also undertook to manage the development of 
regional industrial parks and provide consulting services to agencies with a similar mission. A new 
mission accompanying the change in industrial location policy focus from quantitative to qualitative 
improvement is upgrading the industrial parks to strengthen the innovative capability of firms in the 
parks and make the parks more ecofriendly. KICOX likewise provides various forms of support to firms 
to improve the quality of work life and enable the firms to retain the services of young skilled workers.  
Lessons for South Asia 
 
For South Asia to maintain a high growth rate and create jobs for underused labor, the manufacturing 
sector should grow much faster and increase its share in the economy. Despite the view in some 
quarters that India should promote high-tech and IT industries by sidestepping industrialization based 
on traditional manufacturing promotion, the country does not have to give up manufacturing to create 
enough jobs for its large population and meet growing domestic demand. States with abundant cheap 
labor in particular should promote strategically selected industries, which could have considerable 
spillover effects on industrial dynamism in their regions. In other countries, such as Bangladesh, 
expanding and upgrading labor-intensive export industries is crucial. This requires a well-conceived 
policy framework to remove the antimanufacturing economic bias and attract foreign and local 
enterprises to strategically important industries. 
Getting the Fundamentals Right 
Specific manufacturing promotion policies are impossible to prescribe for the South Asian countries in 
view of their different economic conditions. The general policy prescriptions found in many studies 
apply to all the countries in the region.48 The government should improve the environment for doing 
business and resolve the infrastructure deficit. It should reform administrative procedures, shorten or 
do away with regulatory delays, and increase transparency. Bank credit should be made more 
accessible. The skill shortage should be overcome in collaboration with the business sector. Particularly 
for manufacturing, a labor market made more flexible through reform is very important. So is the ability 
to acquire land at lower cost. To make more land available, the government should find a way to 
release land owned by government or public sector entities.49 
Along with these macrolevel improvements in the business environment, the government must take 
macro and microlevel actions to stimulate investments that will increase the capability and 
competitiveness of domestic manufacturing firms. Macrolevel reforms that normalize the generally 
overvalued exchange rate will facilitate foreign investment and attract foreign enterprises to the 
country if its comparative advantages, such as low wages and fiscal incentives, outweigh its 
disadvantages, such as high cost of doing business, poor infrastructure, and weak local supply chain.  
  
                                                            
48  See Kaplinksy (1999), Kochhar et al. (2006), and Singh (2008), for example. 
49  In India, the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act (2013) sharply raised rural land prices and mandated a 
time-consuming acquisition process. This protracted process will hinder the acquisition of land for industrial sites and 
accelerate deindustrialization. See Kumar (2014). 
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Strengthening the Role of Government as Promoter 
The garment manufacturing industry in Bangladesh succeeded because of cheap labor, fiscal 
incentives, such as tax holidays and tax rebates, and infrastructure benefits for export-oriented 
enterprises in the export processing zones (EPZs). However, Bangladesh should strive to diversify its 
exports through the backward-linked domestic production of intermediate materials, such as fabrics 
for the garment industry, and through new industries. Developing backward-linked industries will help 
Bangladesh increase value added in the garment industry, make its garment exports more competitive 
by reducing export lead time, and improve its balance of trade. The government must act as promoter, 
possibly by subsidizing the self-discovery efforts of enterprises and designing a mechanism for 
lowering risk.50  
Developing Industrial Clusters as Focal Points of Industrial Promotion 
To play the role of promoter, the government should gather industrial and market information, design 
policy measures, and implement policy measures. Cluster development—developing new clusters or 
nudging existing clusters with potential into new industries—may be an effective strategy. The EPZ 
policy, which involves giving incentives to exporters in a designated area, is based on cluster 
development. Bangladesh at present has a streamlined EPZ policy framework with an adequate 
governance structure.51 But it has no systematic strategy for promoting planned clusters.52 Firms in the 
EPZs receive relatively more efficient and better-documented assistance than firms outside the zones, 
where the country’s cluster policy focus is on small and micro enterprises and cottage industries and 
where industrial sites suffer from poor infrastructure and business services.53 As the garment export 
industry matures, Bangladesh should pay more policy attention to the growth of backward-linked 
industries, by setting strategic goals for industrial cluster development.  
In India, increasing government interest in industrial promotion is likely to lead to more reforms to 
boost manufacturing. The rigid labor laws in particular need a major overhaul. Legal reforms should be 
introduced to facilitate land purchase and contract enforcement. The government should invest more 
in social overhead capitals to provide industrial sites with a reliable supply of electricity and water. It 
should direct its efforts toward increasing competition in the domestic market and providing more 
favorable conditions for doing business in the country. From this perspective, industrial park 
development targeted at both the foreign and the domestic market may be an effective strategy for 
promoting foreign-invested manufacturing enterprises, given the bottlenecks in the acquisition of 
useful land.  
  
                                                            
50  Rodrik (2004). 
51  The Prime Minister’s Office administers the EPZs and the EPZ Authority allocates plots on its own land. In addition, the 
EPZs have easier access to public industrial assistance related to infrastructure, technical, and administrative issues. 
(From the introduction to the Industrial Policy for 2005–2015, prepared by the Ministry of Industry, 
http://www.bdtradeinfo.com/business-investment/industrial_policy.php) 
52  The SME Foundation under the Ministry of Industry supports the SMEs in Bangladesh. It groups about 50 firms within a 5-
kilometer radius into a cluster and supports their development. However, the project budget and human resource 
allocation is very small. 
53  According to interviews with officials and members of the Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry in Dhaka. 
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Designing and Implementing Industrial Promotion Policy 
This report does not suggest that the experience of the Republic of Korea in industrial promotion and 
industrial cluster development can or should be directly replicated in the South Asian countries. 
Questions about the adequacy of the HCI drive and whether the Republic of Korea could have 
achieved industrial transformation without it are still unanswered. Moreover, the policy requirements 
are different because the situations are different. The Korean experience nonetheless provides 
valuable lessons in policy making and implementation. In particular, it shows that significant industrial 
upgrading cannot be achieved through macrolevel policy reform and tax incentives alone. The 
government must be an active promoter and must allocate a sufficient budget to industrial promotion 
on the basis of strategic goals. The following guiding principles for designing and implementing 
industrial policy in South Asia are drawn from the Korean success story. 
First, upgrade the industrial capacity of local private enterprises. The main target of industrial 
policy should be the creation and growth of private enterprises, foreign or domestic. To realize the 
motto “Make in India,” priority should be given to export-oriented manufacturing. Bangladesh, on the 
other hand, should give more emphasis to the backward-linked industries of its current export 
industries. Considering the rise in global production sharing, industrial policy should promote the 
participation and upgrading of local enterprises in the global supply chain. 
Second, strengthen the administrative capacity of policy makers. The role of government as 
promoter requires clear goals with detailed policy measures, adequate budgets, and effective 
monitoring. The government must have a full grasp of market information gathered in the field. In the 
Republic of Korea, the monthly export promotion meetings enabled continuous information sharing 
and made policy more responsive to changing conditions in the market. Industrial policy should serve 
to amplify market signals through market-friendly measures. To promote local backward-linked 
industries in Bangladesh, for example, the government should study the domestic supply chain and 
identify bottlenecks in local procurement through a survey of large firms in the EPZs. The government 
should also pinpoint the barriers to the entry of local firms into these industries despite rising demand. 
In India, where state governments should be allowed to customize industrial policy to the specific 
conditions in each state, more attention should be paid to enhancing the ability of state-level policy 
makers to plan and implement the policy. 
Third, distinguish between industrial policy and social policy. The emergence of sizable local firms 
in promoted industries is critical to industry development and upgrading. These firms are the leading 
innovators and coordinators of local production. Microenterprises, while important in increasing the 
income of rural households and reducing poverty, have limited  ability to upgrade industrial capacity by 
entering on their own into new industries that call for new production processes, new technologies, 
and workers with new skills. SMEs in the Republic of Korea, particularly those in manufacturing, gained 
in industrial capacity as their linkages with large firms strengthened through subcontracting. The 
government as a promoter should move strategically, keeping its long-term goals in mind, and give 
preferential treatment to enterprises or industries with strategic purpose. Confusing social policy with 
industrial policy and supporting many clusters of microenterprises scattered all over the country may 
dissipate strategic focus and thus diminish the effectiveness of industrial policy.54 Even in the Republic 
                                                            
54  Again, it is important to reform business and labor regulations to facilitate the creation and growth of small businesses and 
credit disbursements to those businesses, as in Sri Lanka and the Maldives. However, activating SMEs alone will not link 
them to global production networks. Larger local enterprises with technological and organizational capacity are needed to 
link domestic production networks to global value chains. 
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of Korea, where SMEs are relative larger, the effectiveness of SME industrial policy has been criticized 
for the unfocused distribution of policy resources. 
Fourth, align planning with budgeting. Industrial policy should have more concrete content. It should 
comprise specific action plans with adequate budget support and detailed information about the 
conditions under which the policy measures should be applied. The policy framework must be 
effective, consistent, and realizable. Such a policy framework can be established under an effective 
governance system, where the agents involved in industrial promotion, such as the ministries in charge 
and private enterprises, can work together and communicate without difficulty. Coherence between 
planning (or policy making) and budget support is especially important. Without budget support, the 
policy becomes just a wish list of the government. In India, which consists of many states with different 
levels of industrial development, the central government should delegate the design and 
implementation of industrial policy to the local governments for concrete policy action and effective 
implementation. However, the local governments do not have much leeway to use their budgets for 
industrial promotion. Those in less developed states in particular must look to the central government 
for budget assistance to stimulate the growth of local industries. Giving more authority to the local 
governments in industrial policy making and more voice in the preparation of the industrial policy 
budget would address this possible incoherence between the central and local governments. 
Finally, monitor and evaluate policy implementation. More authority requires more effective 
monitoring and evaluation. Despite the intensive intervention of the Government of the Republic of 
Korea in resource allocation for strategic purposes, there was not as much diversion of policy resources 
to totally unproductive activities as in other countries. This was because of the continuous monitoring 
of the policy process by top-level bureaucrats, who were insulated from political interests by 
competitive recruitment and job security guarantees under a seniority system.  
The Korean National Audit System, the Economic Planning Board, the Office of the President, and 
even the Central Intelligence Agency also monitored the policy process constantly. Given the high 
priority placed by the authoritarian government on economic development, this was not surprising. 
Support for the selected enterprises came with specific conditions and targets. Performance was 
continuously monitored and reported to the top policy makers and political leaders. Top leaders held 
periodic field visits and discussed administrative red tape on the spot. In addition, the threat to 
withdraw support, such as rollover of bank loans, put continuous pressure on firms competing with 
other supported firms in similar industries. In most South Asian countries, the governments have their 
own monitoring and evaluation systems. Bangladesh, for instance, set up a management information 
system (MIS) in the Ministry of Industries for the proper monitoring and administration of industrial 
policy.55 In India, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion monitors industrial policy. Current 
monitoring systems must be evaluated and their operations strengthened. Multilevel monitoring, 
including the monitoring of the government agents in charge and the evaluation of their performance, 
could be considered.  
Lessons from Industrial Cluster Development in the Republic of Korea 
Korean industrial location policy follows these same guiding principles. The Government of the 
Republic of Korea approached the development of industrial parks from the standpoint of the 
competitiveness of the sites in providing a favorable productive environment to private firms that were 
resident in the parks. Therefore, when preparing the sites, the government drew up plans for making 
                                                            
55  See the Industrial Policy of Bangladesh at http://www.bdtradeinfo.com/business-investment/industrial_policy.php 
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the needed infrastructure, business services, supply of skilled labor, and technological assistance 
available to the firms in the parks. Various related ministries, such as the ministries of industry, 
transport, education and training, and science and technology, collaborated on the development of the 
parks. Policy coordination took place and public agencies were established to implement the policies 
from the start of construction to its end, as well as to manage the parks. Moreover, government 
support for industrial cluster development was not given on a case-by-case basis. Instead, the process 
and incentive measures were institutionalized with clear procedures and the corresponding legal basis. 
Developers and firms knew what they could expect to earn from the investments they decided to 
make. Institutionalization of support was also important in improving transparency and sending clear 
industrial policy signals.  
The lessons from the Korean experience with industrial cluster development policy can be 
summarized as follows.  
First, provide adequate incentives consistent with policy objectives. To promote industries 
through industrial park development, the government should provide suitable incentives, sometimes 
substantial ones, for industrial park development and management. Preferential treatment in the 
acquisition of land, the supply of infrastructure, and the provision of business and administrative 
services is required. To make the industrial parks competitive, their development and management 
should be based on the cluster approach. The government should subsidize the developers and 
resident firms to attract firms in the selected industries to locate in the parks. South Asian 
governments that think of themselves as regulators may regard giving land-use permits as preferential 
treatment and believe that industrial cluster development policy stops there. The Bangladesh 
government’s offer of unused public lands, where the logistics and infrastructure are generally less 
attractive, was disappointing to local enterprises.56 Policy makers must think like the owners of the 
enterprises at the proposed sites.  
Second, engage in industrial cluster development from a long-term perspective. Since the 
development of competitive industrial parks incurs considerable costs and public spending, it should 
be a strategic undertaking under a long-term and comprehensive national land-use plan. In the 
Republic of Korea, the plan for developing industrial complexes for industrial promotion spanned more 
than 2 decades. India’s Industrial Corridor Program involves long-term economic development based 
on the spatial distribution of industries in the designated regions. Although the program includes 
detailed planning of projects connecting industrial hub cities, it should be reevaluated in relation to 
overall territorial development plans and considering other sectors and their industrial linkages. The 
priorities of subprograms and issues such as timing and public and private sector expenses must be 
assessed. How the projects are to be financed should likewise be planned. 
Third, institutionalize incentives. Effective and systematic incentives for implementing industrial 
cluster development policy should be institutionalized. In the Republic of Korea, the incentives and 
administrative procedures in support of the establishment and operation of industrial parks for the 
manufacturing industries are detailed in two representative laws—one for development and another 
for the management of industrial clusters. The country has been modifying the legal basis of 
government support for industrial site development and cluster management to suit changing 
conditions. Special-purpose industrial sites with differences in treatment and incentives are being 
developed. To attract the private sector to the development of industrial parks, legislated procedures 
and incentives are important. They reduce the discretion of bureaucrats and give investors confidence 
in policy. In India, where industrial park development depends on state-level action, the legal basis for 
                                                            
56  Based on the author’s interviews with local businessmen in Dhaka. 
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such state-level development should be established. The laws should conform to the policy principles 
of the central government and their legal basis.   
Finally, create a specialized public agency to implement the policy. Creating an agency specifically 
to develop and manage industrial parks or clusters may facilitate the effective and efficient 
implementation of the policy. The Republic of Korea set up a public entity with those specialized tasks. 
KICOX helps ensure that, after their construction, the industrial parks operate in accordance with the 
industrial policy. It also provides continuous business and administrative services to the firms in the 
parks, keeping the planned sites attractive to investors and fully occupied. Specialized agencies can put 
all their efforts into their designated tasks because they have specific goals against which their 
performance is evaluated. Government bureaucrats, on the other hand, with their various industrial 
policy concerns, including skill development, R&D, and FDI, and frequently changing positions within 
the government, cannot take charge of industrial cluster development, which usually takes a long 
period of time. In India, the Gujarat state government established the Gujarat Industrial Development 
Corporation (GIDC) to deal with land acquisition and allotment.57 However, GIDC’s functions should 
not stop at land acquisition but should also include all other matters related to the development of 
industrial production sites, such as infrastructure provision, financing, and management after 
construction. Such specialized agencies should be made responsible for the implementation of 
industrial park development from start to finish.  
 
  
                                                            
57  See the Gujarat Industrial Policy 2015. 
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